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Case No. 14548 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action arises out of a claim by plaintiff for breach 
of contract by defendant in the purchase of business assets. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COU^T 
The case was tried to the Court, judgment entered in favor 
of plaintiff and against defendant Ken Christopher, appellant, for 
the sum of $4,750.00, together with $450.00 interest and $22.00 
costs. Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in 
his favor as a matter of law or a new trial, if required. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, as seller, and J. C. Martin and Ken Christopher, 
as purchasers, entered into an agreement (Exhibit 1) dated the 
first of September, 1974. Under that agreement Martin and 
Christopher agreed to purchase certain equipment, trucks, and 
accounts receivable as shown by Exhibit "A". The agreement of 
September 1 was not performed and after Martin and Christopher 
had split up on the 22nd of January, 1975, Ken Christopher, the 
appellant, and Town and Country Disposal, Inc. entered into an 
agreement which is Exhibit 4. 
Under Exhibit 4 plaintiff reserved all of its rights against 
J. C. Martin. Christopher was relieved from his obligations under 
the agreement of September 1, 1974 and entered into the new 
agreement, Exhibit 4. 
Exhibit 4 provides for plaintiff to sell to defendant one 
Leach Sani-Cruiser, monthly payments of $736.27 assumed, 52 trash 
containers, monthly payments of $396.14 assumed, and the accounts 
and business routes of plaintiff. Defendant assumed the balance 
owing by plaintiff to Leach Credit Corporation on the Sani-Cruiser, 
to IDS Leasing Company on the trash containers, and agreed to pay 
$4,750.00 for the accounts and business routes that plaintiff 
had developed. 
Dates were set up for the time when the payments were due. 
One payment on the 6th of January, which is prior to the date of 
the agreement, one payment due on the 19th of January, a date prior 
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to the date of the agreement, and one payment due on the 22nd 
of January, the day of the agreement. Monthly installments were 
to be paid thereafter on the three separate items. 
This is no disagreement relating to the amounts paid by 
defendant. A list of payments is shown on Exhibit 5, a photostatic 
copy of the Answers to Interrogatories prepared by defendant. 
The list shows payments of $736.27 on July 19 and February 19, 
1975, payments of $250.00 on January 22 and $397.00 on January 22. 
Additional payments of $436.27 were made on March 3, 1975 and 
$396.99 on March 3, 1975. Defendant claims that as of the 6th of 
March, 1975, his payments were current as far as the contract of 
January 22, 1975 is concerned. Plaintiff admits the payments on 
equipment were current, but denies the payment on accounts was 
paid. 
Plaintiff claims that it served on defendant the notice, 
plaintiff's Exhibit 9, notifying him as of February 25, 1975 
that he was in default and that the equipment he was purchasing 
would be taken back as of March 7, 1975. Attached to the Complaint 
is an additional notice claimed to have been served by the plaintiff 
upon defendant. It is dated February 27, 1975 and claims 
repossession on or after the 6th of March, 1975. 
Paragraph VII of the agreement of January 22, Exhibit 4, 
contains a provision as to default by purchaser, the defendant. 
It provides that notice by the plaintiff ^ould be given not less 
than ten days prior to the date when seller intended to repossess 
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and purchaser would be able to cure the defect in performance. 
It also provided that should the purchaser fail to cure the defect, 
then the balance owing for the purchase price of the business, 
that is $4,750.00, would be due and would bear interest at the rate 
of 10% per annum from and after the date of delinquency. 
Plaintiff repossessed the Sani-Cruiser on the 7th day of 
March. Defendant Christopher delivered back to the plaintiff the 
trash containers on or about the 28th day of March, 1975 and paid 
no further sum on the contract balance. 
The primary activity envisioned by parties was the 
collecting of garbage by defendant. It was necessary for the 
business to operate that there would be the garbage truck and 
the trash containers into which the garbage would be deposited. 
Almost immediately following the January 22 agreement, 
trouble began to occur. 
Plaintiff continually claimed that the defendant was in 
arrears in his payments and made repeated demands on him for 
payments. Defendant steadfastly claimed that he was current in 
his contract. Although the agreement did not provide or mention 
the property insurance or public liability insurance, at the time 
of trial plaintiff claimed that defendant could not provide 
insurance and did not provide insurance and that, as a consequence, 
financing arrangements contemplated by the parties for the trash 
containers were never consummated. Plaintiff had no purchase 
agreement or right of possession to the 52 trash containers that 
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it had agreed to sell to defendant. (See R. 125, R. 163, R.164) 
Defendant made the checks payable for the purchase price 
of the containers to Atlas Equipment, plaintiff's officer Barry 
Wickel, and the IDS Corporation. A check dated January 22 with 
IDS1 name on it, defendant discovered, was cashed by plaintiff 
without the IDS endorsement (R. 163) . This money was retained 
by plaintiff and has never been paid to anybody. 
A cashier's check, Exhibit 6, dated January 23, 1975 for 
$397.00 to be applied on the containers was not cashed. Plaintiff 
could not get the IDS endorsement and the failure to have the 
proper endorsement was discovered before the check was paid. 
Exhibit 6 is still uncashed (R. 161). 
The discussions between plaintiff's officers and defendant 
became more heated as time went on. Finally, on or about the 
25th of February, the plaintiff claims it gave defendant notice 
of default and of its intention to repossess its equipment. Date 
of repossession is given as March 7, 1975. Defendant denies that 
this notice was ever received by him (R. 203) . However, it is 
undisputed that heated discussions occurred. On the 6th of 
March, 1975, an altercation occurred between defendant and Wickel, 
President of plaintiff (R. 256). 
A serious conflict in the evidence arises over Exhibit 9, 
the notice of default. Attached to the Complaint was a notice 
of default dated February 27, which the Complaint alleges is the 
notice of default given to defendant. This notice sets forth that 
plaintiff would retake its equipment on March 6, 1975. On March 7, 
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1975, while the defendant was out on the garbage collecting 
route, plaintiff1s employees waited until defendant was out of 
the truck, jumped in it, and drove it away (R. 170). The 
defendant immediately thereafter began to gather in the containers 
covered by the agreement. By March 28 he had returned them to 
the possession of the plaintiff (R. 212). 
At the time of trial, the Court awarded no deficiency on 
the payment of the purchase price, but granted judgment against 
the defendant for the price of the accounts and route in the 
amount of $4,750.00 and then gave 107o interest on said amount 
from and after the 29th of February, 1975. 
Defendant answered the Complaint of plaintiff and alleged 
that there was an unlawful repossession by plaintiff. That the 
repossession prevented him from performing the agreement of 
January 22, 1975. His position was that the action on the part 
of the plaintiff effectively rescinded and terminated the 
contractual relationship between the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The repossession by plaintiff of the Leach 
Sani-Cruiser was unlawful. 
Point II. Plaintiff's failure to have any IDS agreement 




THE REPOSSESSION OF THE LEACH SANI-CRUISER BY PLAINTIFF 
WAS UNLAWFUL. 
The evidence is undisputed that on the 7th of March, 1975, 
the date that agents of plaintiff actually seized the Sani-Cruiser 
from defendant, defendant was current in his payments on the 
Sani-Cruiser. Record shows that he paid every payment required 
under the contract of January 22, 1975, and the Court so found. 
Plaintiff had given notice, it claims. It is difficult 
to know whether or not the notice was dated the 27th of February, 
1975 or the 25th of February, 1975, plaintiff having furnished 
both notices. Whichever date the notice is determined to be, 
it was an unjustified and improper notice|of termination. There 
was no breach by the defendant of the terms of the contract on 
the day of the notice. In addition, defendant claims repossession 
occurred without giving to the defendant the ten days which is 
permitted by the agreement in which to rectify his delinquency, 
if any. 
Between the dates of the notice of delinquency and the 
7th of March, there is no dispute that the agents of plaintiff 
and defendant met. Defendant had actually paid to agents of 
plaintiff three payments, one of $300.00 on February 28, 1975, 
one of $436.27 on March 3, 1975, and one of $396.99 on March 3, 
1975, a total of $1,133.26. Receipt of these payments is 
acknowledged. Plaintiff's answer on the payments is that they 
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were to be applied to a prior obligation incurred under the 
old contract. 
It is defendant's position that the contract, Exhibit 4, 
was a representation and agreement by plaintiff to sell an 
operation that was interdependent. Each of the various items 
covered by the agreement depended upon the existence of the other. 
All three items mentioned in the contract were necessary for the 
defendant to perform the agreement. 
All parties anticipated that defendant would have to have 
the Leach Sani-Cruiser to pick up the garbage, that the containers 
would be necessary for the various accounts to deposit the 
garbage, and that the accounts themselves and routes would be 
serviced only if the first two items of equipment could be used 
by defendant. 
When the plaintiff took from defendant the Sani-Cruiser, 
it destroyed defendant's ability to perform the other portions 
of the agreement and denied to him the income from which all 
parties expected payment would be made on the three separate items 
being purchased. 
If the repossession of the Sani-Cruiser was wrongful and 
unlawful, as defendant claims it was, then it is defendant's 
position that plaintiff has wrongfully deprived him of the 
necessary equipment to perform the agreement and cannot now claim 
damages as awarded by the Court. Defendant relies on the principle 
of law enunciated by this Court in Zion's Property, Inc. v. Holt, 
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538 P.2d 1319 (Utah) , to-wit: "One party may not render it 
difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and 
then take advantage of the nonperformance he has caused.11 Fischer 
v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah); Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 
323 P.2d 712, 7 Utah 2d 293; Haymore v. Levinson, 328 P.2d 307, 
8 Utah 2d 66; 17A C.J.S., §468, pg. 638. 
The rule is most clearly stated in Talbott v. Nibert, 
167 Kan. 138, 206 P.2d 131, in the following language: 
"The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in 
absolute justice, that a party to a contract cannot 
prevent performance by another and derive any benefit, 
or escape any liability, from his d>wn failure to 
perform a necessary condition. Dill v. Pope, 29 Kan. 
289; National Supply Co. v. United Kansas Portland 
Cement Co., 91 Kan. 509, 512, 138 P. 599; Briney v. 
Toews, 150 Kan. 489, 495, 95 P.2d 355. And this is 
the universal rule. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts §§381, 386; 
2 C.J., Agency, §439, p. 772; 3 C.J.S., Agency §185; 
13 C.J., Contracts, §§721, 722, 723; 17 C.J.S., 
Contracts, §§468, 469; Restatement, Contracts, §315.,f 
It is submitted that the admission by plaintiff that the 
payments on the truck and containers were current makes the 
repossession a breach of contract by plairitiff and unlawful. No 
right to claim further performance or breach by defendant survived 
the repossession. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO HAVE ANY IDS AGREEMENT EXCUSES 
PERFORMANCE BY DEFENDANT. 
It was discovered after January 22, 1975 that plaintiff 
had no contract with IDS and that IDS would not finance the 
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containers. Plaintiff had no right to possession of said 
containers or any agreement by which it could purchase the 
containers (R. 125, R. 148, R. 163). 
Plaintiff claims that this is because defendant could not 
obtain insurance on the containers. There is no evidence in the 
record that insurance on the containers was required as a condition 
of defendantfs performance. The writings are silent on this score. 
Regardless of whether or not the defendant was to blame 
for the failure of IDS to agree to finance the containers or 
plaintiff was to blame for such failure, by March 3 it had become 
apparent that IDS was not going to finance the containers and the 
payments that the defendant had made on the containers was being 
diverted to other uses by plaintiff. 
Two checks had been paid on the IDS account, one in the 
amount of $397.00 and the other inthe amount of $396.99. The one 
check had actually been cashed by plaintiff without obtaining the 
endorsement of IDS. The other one was returned and is still 
uncashed because IDS refuses to endorse the check. 
It appeared that the containers were owned by George 
Swanson of Swanson & Sons Company, and that neither the plaintiff, 
defendant, nor IDS has any right whatsoever to said containers 
(R. 125, R. 148, R. 163). 
It is defendant's position then that in addition to the 
wrongful repossession by the plaintiff of the Sani-Cruiser, the 
plaintiff was unable, and it now appeared falsely represented, 
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that it was able to sell and deliver a right of possession or 
title to the containers necessary for defendant's garbage 
collection operation. 
It is defendant's position that when parties have contracted 
in reliance upon a certain state of facts existing, and it develops 
that the facts do not exist and that the parties have been mistaken 
and the parties cannot accomplish the end that each anticipated 
in the making of the contract, neither pa£ty is entitled to 
damages for breach of contract. 
Plaintiff claims the lack of insurance was discussed and 
its lack of interest revealed to defendant, but signed an agreement 
with language in it that clearly stated it had an agreement with 
IDS. Defendant submits the written document language must prevail 
over oral recollection. 
This Court, in Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, 
15 Utah 2d 271, 391 P.2d 300, recognized that where parties 
contract for certain performance and a basic subject matter on 
which performance depended no longer exists, parties are excused 
from further performance. The Court cited as authority for its 
holding Parrish v. Stratton Cripple Creek Mining & Development Co., 
116 P.2d 207, Cert. Denied 61, S.Ct. 738, ftl2 U.S. 698, 85 L.Ed. 1132 
The Court there held: 
"While we find no Colorado decision on the point, it 
is well settled by the adjudicated ceases in England 
and the United States that where parties enter into a 
contract on the assumption that some particular thing 
essential to its performance will continue to exist 
and be available for the purpose an4 neither agrees to 
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be responsible for its continued existence and 
availability, the contract must be regarded as 
subject to an implied condition that if, without 
the fault of either party, the particular thing 
ceases to exist or be available for the purpose, 
the contract shall be dissolved and the parties 
excused from performing it. 
MMr. Williston, in his Revised Edition of his work 
on Contracts, §1948, states the principle as follows: 
'Not only where a specific thing is itself to be sold 
or transferred, but wherever a contract required for 
its performance the existence of a specific thing, 
the fortuitous destruction of that thing, or such 
impairment of it as makes it unavailable, excuses 
the promisor, unless he has clearly assumed the risk 
of its continued existence,1 and cites Operators1 
Oil Co. v. Barbre, 10 Cir., 65 F.2d 857, 861, 862, 
where this court held that if performance is rendered 
impossible by proceedings in a receivership of a third 
party for which the promisor is in no wise responsible, 
performance by the promisor is excused/1 
See also Tulsa Opera House Co. v. Mitchell, 24 P.2d 997, 
165 Okl. 61. 
This doctrine is called the doctrine of impossibility 
excusing performance and is cited and explained in Twin Harbours 
Lumber Co. v. Carrico, 92 Idaho 343, 442 P.2d 753, in the following 
language: 
nThe doctrine of impossibility excusing performance 
of a contractual obligation, insofar as relevant in 
the present setting, provides generally that if by 
express terms of a bargain or within the contemplation 
of the bargaining parties the existence of a specific 
thing is essentially necessary for the performance of 
a promise in the bargain, 'a duty to perform the promise 
* * * is discharged if the thing * * * subsequently is 
not in existence in time for seasonable performance1." 1 1 
"11. 2 Restatement, Contracts §460 (19,32). Accord 
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 
44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839 (1965); cf., Cannon v. 
Huhndorf", 67 Wash.2d 778, 409 P.2d 865 (1966); United 
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States v. Buffalo Coal Mining Company, 345 F.2d 517 
(on denial of petition for rehearing) (9th Circ. 1865); 
Foster v. Atlantic Refining Company, 329 F.2d 485, 
(5th Cir. 1964); see generally Annot., Modern Status 
of the Rules Regarding Impossibility of Performance as 
Defense in Action for Breach of Contract, 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 
§19, pp. 92." 
The doctrine is also known as the doctrine of frustration. 
See 17A C.J.S., §463(2), pg. 616. Many cases are cited and the 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §28$, quoted as follows: 
I!Where the assumed possibility of a desired object 
or effect to be attained by either party to a contract 
forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, 
and this object or effect is or sorely will be frustrated, 
a promisor who is without fault in causing the frustration, 
and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty 
of performing his promise unless a contrary intention 
appears." 
Defendant submits that without a right to purchase the 
containers for the garbage business and nb agreement with IDS, 
performance by defendant of the contract is effectively frustrated. 
The failure of plaintiff to have such an agreement or some right 
to the containers certainly on January 22 could not have been 
the responsibility of defendant. It is respectfully submitted 
that this failure on plaintiff's part excused performance by 
defendant and no judgment should have be^n awarded against him. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Court should reverse 
the trial court and enter judgment in favc^ r of defendant and 
against the plaintiff and award his costs incurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 Sc^ uth State Street 
Salt Ldke City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Ken Christopher, 
Defendant-Appellant 
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